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Abstract— Data aggregation is an integral part of Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) deployment that is implemented 
by the concentrator. Data aggregation reduces the number of 
transmissions, thereby reducing communication costs and 
increasing the bandwidth utilization of AMI. However, the 
concentrator poses a great risk of being tampered with, leading to 
erroneous bills and possible consumer disputes. In this paper, we 
propose an end-to-end integrity protocol using elliptic curve based 
chameleon hashing to provide data integrity and authenticity. The 
concentrator generates and sends a chameleon hash value of the 
aggregated readings to the Meter Data Management System 
(MDMS) for verification, while the smart meter with the trapdoor 
key computes and sends a commitment value to the MDMS so that 
the resulting chameleon hash value calculated by the MDMS is 
equivalent to the previous hash value sent by the concentrator. By 
comparing the two hash values, the MDMS can validate the 
integrity and authenticity of the data sent by the concentrator. 
Compared with the discrete logarithm implementation, the ECC 
implementation reduces the computational cost of MDMS, 
concentrator and smart meter by approximately 36.8%, 80%, and 
99% respectively. We also demonstrate the security soundness of 
our protocol through informal security analysis. 
 
Index Terms— Double Trapdoor Chameleon hashing; Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography; Polynomial-based Key Management 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an integrated 
system consisting of smart meters, communication networks and 
Meter Data Management Systems (MDMSs) [1]. The smart 
meters collect energy reports from the household appliances and 
send them to the MDMS over the communication networks. The 
communication network provides a two-way communication 
between the smart meters and the MDMS and supports a wide 
range of wireless technologies such as cellular, WiSUN [2], 
WiMAX [3], Bluetooth [4], etc. To reduce the number of 
message transmissions and bandwidth consumption, a 
concentrator is deployed in the communication network to 
aggregate all the energy reports before forwarding the readings 
to the MDMS. On the other hand, the MDMS is responsible for 
storing and processing the collected readings for billing 
purposes. AMI improves the operational efficiency and cost 
savings related to metering, billing and labor costs. Since the 
energy consumption values are automatically read and sent to 
the MDMS, AMI can provide more accurate and timely readings 
than the current manual method, thus reducing the number of 
consumer disputes. The end-consumers can better track their 
usage to save energy and money. For the utility companies who 
are operating the MDMS, they can monitor the usage patterns of 
each household to drive more innovations on the type of tariffs 
they provide.  
Despite the huge benefits, it is challenging to achieve secure 
data aggregation because the concentrators are typically 
deployed in unattended locations and can be easily compromised 
by adversaries. In particular, the compromised concentrator can 
be used to manipulate and tamper with the readings before 
sending the aggregated data back to the MDMS. This could lead 
to erroneous bills, energy thefts, and possible consumer disputes. 
In addition, the data source must be authenticated to ensure that 
the readings are originated from the intended sender to ensure 
proper operation.  
In this paper, we propose an end-to-end data integrity 
protocol to secure data aggregation in AMI with the goal of 
providing data integrity and data source authentication. We 
adopt the idea of chameleon hashing presented in [5] and 
introduce several enhancements. Specifically, we propose a 
chameleon hash function based on the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [6] technology to improve the 
implementation efficiency since the smart meters have limited 
storage and processing power. In order to prevent the exposure 
of the trapdoor key through node capture attack, our scheme uses 
double trapdoor keys to construct the ECC-based chameleon 
hash function, where each trapdoor key is held by a different 
entity i.e. the MDMS and the smart meters, respectively. 
However, the use of two trapdoor keys requires the smart meters 
to have the MDMS’s trapdoor key so that they can compute a 
commitment to the MDMS to facilitate the reconstruction of the 
chameleon hash value for verification. To solve this problem, 
our scheme uses a polynomial-based key management scheme 
[7] to disseminate the blind copy of the MDMS’s trapdoor key 
without exposing the actual key value. In short, our contributions 
are as follows: 
 
1. Propose an efficient chameleon hash function based on 
ECC to provide end-to-end security.  
2. Redesign the chameleon hash function using double 
trapdoor keys to prevent exposure of the chameleon 
trapdoor keys even if the smart meter is compromised. 
3. Propose a polynomial-based key management scheme to 
facilitate the construction of commitment by the smart 
meter and the reconstruction of the chameleon hash value 
by the MDMS. 
4. Conduct a performance comparison and security analysis 
of our protocol with existing work based on the Discrete 
Logarithmic (DL) assumption. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides 
a brief survey of relevant work on secure data aggregation. 
Section III outlines and details the proposed protocol. Section 
IV and V provides the security analysis and performance 
evaluation of our proposal. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several works have been proposed in the literature to 
preserve integrity for AMI data aggregation. For instance, Li et 
al. [8] proposed a homomorphic signature scheme for 
homomorphically encrypted data that supports batch verification 
of the aggregated results. The basis of their approach is based on 
the bilinear map. Other similar homomorphic-based signature 
schemes include [9], [10] and [11]. While these homomorphic-
based schemes are promising, they are not practical in that the 
smart meter must compute a homomorphic signature for each 
message it transmits before they are aggregated. Therefore, these 
approaches incur high computational and communication costs, 
resulting in performance degradation. 
Unlike the above approach, Keoh et al. [5] proposed a novel 
end-to-end data integrity protocol for AMI based on the 
properties of chameleon hashing [12]. The basic idea is that the 
owner of the trapdoor key i.e. the smart meter must generate the 
same chameleon hash value as the concentrator by computing a 
commitment using its own energy readings so that the MDMS 
can use it to verify the hash value of the concentrator. In this 
case, the commitment that is sent to the MDMS need not be 
signed which makes the scheme very efficient.  In [13], Keoh et 
al. formalized this idea by designing the chameleon hash 
function based on the DL assumptions. However, the DL 
approach incurs high computation cost which is not suitable for 
resource-constrained smart meters. Moreover, their approach is 
vulnerable to key exposure problem in which anyone with the 
knowledge of a hash collision can recover the private trapdoor 
key [14]. Inspired by [13], this paper proposes enhancements to 
the chameleon hash scheme in order to mitigate these shortfalls. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, we introduce our end-to-end data integrity 
protocol for securing data aggregation. Our protocol is based on 
a double trapdoor chameleon hash function [15] and is 
constructed using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [6] to 
achieve better efficiency.  
In essence, the concentrator aggregates the energy readings 
from the smart meters and calculates a chameleon hash value 
using the public keys that are associated to the two trapdoor keys 
of the chameleon hash function. To verify the chameleon hash 
value, a smart meter equipped with one of the trapdoor keys 
needs to calculate a commitment value using its own energy 
readings such that the resultant chameleon hash value is 
equivalent to the previous hash value sent by the concentrator. 
The commitment value is then forwarded to the MDMS where a 
second trapdoor key is applied to verify the correctness of the 
readings sent by the concentrator. To facilitate the construction 
of the commitment value and subsequently the chameleon hash 
value, the MDMS embeds a blind copy of its trapdoor key in the 
polynomial and distribute it to all the smart meters using a 
polynomial-based key distribution scheme [7]. The entire 
operation is divided into five phases: setup, data aggregation, 
trapdoor collision, hash verification and key blinding. 
A. Setup Phase 
In the setup phase, the MDMS generates the system 
parameters. We assume that the smart meters in the same 
geographic area form a group and share the same group trapdoor 
key. We assume that the smart meters are well-behaved and 
comply with the rules of the protocol, but they may be 
compromised. We also assume that the compromised smart 
meter or concentrator act alone, and the problem of collusion is 
out of the scope of this paper. The system parameters are 
generated as follows. 
• Generate ECC domain parameters (, , , , , ) 
MDMS determines the ECC domain parameters based on 
the elliptic curve 
 of the form  ( ) =  +  +
 ( ) over the finite field,  where  is a large prime 
number and ,  are the coefficients of the elliptic curve.  
is a generator denoted by a point ( , ) selected from the 
elliptic curve and  is the order of the generator. The 
security of ECC is derived from the difficulty of the Elliptic 
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). 
• Generate chameleon hash function  
The smart meter chooses a random value  ∈ [1,  − 1] as 
the group trapdoor key, computes the chameleon hash 
public key as Χ = , and register the public key with the 
MDMS. Similarly, the MDMS selects the second trapdoor 
key  ∈ [1,  − 1] and computes the corresponding 
chameleon hash public key as Υ = . The chameleon 
trapdoor key is &' = (, ) and the chameleon public key 
is (' = (Χ, Υ). Next, MDMS defines a double trapdoor 
chameleon hash function as follows. 
()*(, +) = ℎ(ℎ-(||Χ), Υ)(/ + Υ) + + ( ) (1) 
 
where ℎ-: 10,13∗ → 10,136 is a secure hash function that 
maps an arbitrary length string to a fixed string of length 7 
and ℎ: 89 × ; → 89 is a keyed-hashed function that takes 
as input the result of ℎ- and the public key of MDMS. 
• Generate polynomial <=(>) for smart meters in a group 
Each smart meter ?@ in group A also receives a unique pre-
shared key 
'@ from the MDMS for secure unicast 
communications. Using the pre-shared keys of all the smart 
meters in the group, MDMS constructs a polynomial and 
embeds its trapdoor key  in the polynomial as shown in 
(2). However, the MDMS selects a secret random value 
+BB ∈ [1,  − 1]  to conceal the actual value of the trapdoor 
key  to prevent the exposure of the trapdoor key. 
CD () = ( − 
'-)( − 
') … ( − 
'@) + +BB (2) 
 
The polynomial is then preloaded by the MDMS to all the 
smart meters in a group. Different groups of smart meters 
will receive different polynomials. 
Finally, MDMS publishes the system parameters 
F
, , , , , , ℎ-, ℎ, (', (')* , CD()G to all the smart 
meters and concentrators in the network where CD() refers to 
the polynomial of group A. 
B. Data Aggregation Phase 
For a group of smart meters ?-, ?, … , ?9 where  is 
the number of meters in the group, each smart meter periodically 
sends an energy report @(D) to the concentrator for aggregation 
where @(D) denotes the readings at time A for ?@. Upon 
receiving the individual reports from the smart meters, the 
concentrator aggregates the individual reports according to 
equation (3). 
 
HII(D) = J @(D)
9
@K-
 
(3) 
 
The concentrator then selects a random value +(D) ∈ [1,  − 1], 
and calculates the chameleon hash value of the aggregated 
message using equation (1), with the aggregated readings HII(D)  
in (3) and the chameleon hash public key (' as inputs. After 
that, the concentrator sends the individual smart meter 
readings @(D) , the chameleon hash value ()*(D)  and the random 
value + (D) to the MDMS for verification. The message tuple 
LF-(D) , (D), … , 9(D)G, +(D), MNO(()*(D) )P is signed by the 
concentrator’s private key using any unforgeable signature 
scheme to prove authenticity and non-repudiation. At the same 
time, the concentrator sends (()*(D) , ℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), +(D)) back to 
the group of smart meters so that they can produce a chameleon 
hash collision during the trapdoor collision phase (described in 
next section). The aggregated message HII(D)  is hashed using ℎ- 
to prevent an adversary from extracting energy readings about 
other smart meters. The pseudocode of the data aggregation 
phase is shown in Algorithm 1. 
When the MDMS receives the message 
tuple LF-(D), (D), … , 9(D)G, + (D), MNO(()*(D) )P from the 
concentrator, the MDMS adds up all the received meter readings 
@(D) at time A and computes the chameleon hash value using 
equation (1) with the given +(D) value. After that, it uses the 
public key of the concentrator to verify the signature. If the 
verification is successful, MDMS accepts the integrity and 
authenticity of the received data, and stores the meter readings 
as well as the chameleon hash value ()*(D)  for end-to-end 
verification later. 
C. Trapdoor Collision Phase 
This phase is executed by the smart meters every & period. 
On receiving A copies of (()*(D) , ℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), +(D))  from the 
concentrator where A → (1 ≤ A ≤ &), each smart meter selects 
any one of them to calculate a +B value so that the generated 
chameleon hash value of its own energy readings B is 
equivalent to the chameleon hash value stored by the MDMS at 
time A i.e.  ()*(B, +B) = ()*(D) (HII(D) , +(D)) where B ≠ HII(D) . 
In this case, the message B is the sum of all the energy readings 
that the smart meter had sent during period &. To compute the +B 
value, the smart meter must solve the following. 
 
+B = (x + y)Uℎ(ℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V
+ +(D) ( ) 
(4) 
 
Since the smart meter does not have knowledge of MDMS’s 
trapdoor key y, it is not able to compute the +B value. So, the 
smart meter splits the construction of +B value into two 
components, namely, +-B and +B and sends them as commitments 
to the MDMS. First, the smart meter substitutes its pre-shared 
key 
'@ into the preloaded polynomial in (2) to retrieve the 
concealed trapdoor key + BB. Using the +BB value, the smart 
meter executes equation (5) to calculate the two components. 
 
+-B = Uℎ(ℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V + +(D) 
+B = +BBUℎ(ℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V 
 
(5) 
Remark 1: If the smart meter is compromised by an adversary, 
the trapdoor key  is still safe because it is blinded and 
randomized by the secret value + BB.  
Algorithm 1: Generate Chameleon Hash at time W ≤ = ≤ X 
(Concentrator) 
Inputs:  
Chameleon hash public key: Χ = xG, Υ = yG, 
Energy readings from different smart meters: @ (D) ∀[ ∈ (1, … ), 
Random value: +(D) 
 
Output: (\6(D)FHII(D) , +(D)G  
 
(1) For [ to  smart meters in a group do 
HII(D) = J @(D)
9
@K-
 
End For 
(2) Select a cryptographic secure random integer +(D) from [1,  − 1] 
and compute scalar multiplication ]- ← +(D) ∙  
(3) Compute ()*(D)FHII(D) , +(D)G = ℎFℎ-FHII(D) ||ΧG, ΥG(Χ + Υ) +
+(D) ( ) 
(3.1) Compute ] ← ℎ- FHII(D) ||ΧG using SHA-2  
(3.2) Compute HMAC value ] ← ℎ(]- , Υ)  
(3.3) Compute sum of product ]` ← Χ] + Υ] 
(3.3) Output ()*(D) FHII(D) , +(D)G ← ]` + ]- 
(4) Send signed F@(D), +(D) , MNO(()*(D))G to MDMS 
(5) Send F()*(D) , ℎ-FHII(D) ||ΧG, +(D)G to smart meters 
The derived +-B and +B commitments are then sent to the 
MDMS, encrypted using the smart meter pre-shared key 
'@ to 
provide confidentiality and privacy. Using the commitment 
values, MDMS will be able to reconstruct the + B value to 
calculate the chameleon hash value (described in next section) 
and verify that the previous aggregated messages sent by the 
concentrator are not tampered with, and that the readings truly 
originate from the smart meters. The detailed steps of this phase 
is summarized in Algorithm 2. 
D. Hash Verification Phase 
When the MDMS receives the commitments (+-B, +B) from 
smart meter ?@ , it uses the pre-shared key 
'@ of smart meter 
[ to decrypt the message to recover (+-B, +B). The MDMS then 
divides +B by  +BB to reconstruct the actual value as +Ba .  Using +-B 
and the derived +Ba  values, the MDMS reconstructs the true value 
of +Bas  +B bbb. Next, the MDMS computes B by summing up all 
the meter readings @  of smart meter [ for & intervals and 
computes the chameleon hash value ()*B  using equation (6) and 
the derived +B bbb. More formally, MDMS calculates the following: 
 
()*(B, +B bbb) = ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)(Χ + Υ)+ +B bbb ( ) 
(6) 
 
The MDMS compares the calculated ()*B (B, +B bbb) with the 
previous value L()*(D) FHII(D) , +(D)GP stored in the database at 
time A. If the two hash values match, it means that the reported 
readings from the concentrator are consistent with each other, 
                                                          
1 The authenticity of the issued chameleon hash public key ΥB can be verified 
using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates 
and are not tampered with. If the verification is unsuccessful, it 
means that either the concentrator or the reporting smart meter 
is compromised. To verify the status, the MDMS may request 
another smart meter in the group to send the commitments to 
validate the chameleon hash value at time A. If successful, the 
MDMS concludes that the concentrator is compromised. As 
long as the majority of the smart meters in the group is trusted, 
detection of compromised concentrator will always work. The 
verification process is shown in Algorithm 3. 
E. Key Blinding Phase 
After each & period, the MDMS randomizes its trapdoor 
key  to limit the vulnerability of key exposure to increase 
security. The key randomization interval can be configured to 
be updated every 6 or 12 hours, depending on the application 
specifications. To support this requirement, the polynomial-
based key management mechanism is used.    
First, the MDMS selects a new random blinding value 
+9cdBB ∈ [1,  − 1] and computes a new concealed trapdoor key 
as +9cdBB . After that, the MDMS constructs a new polynomial 
C@B() for group [ using the pre-shared keys of all the smart 
meters in the group as C@B() = ( − 
'-)( − 
') … ( −
'9) + +9cdBB . The MDMS then broadcasts C@B() to the group 
smart meters and the concentrator, respectively1. Upon 
receiving the new polynomial, every smart meter in the group 
uses its secret key 
'@ to retrieve the new concealed trapdoor 
key +9cdBB  by computing C@B(
'@). Once +9cdBB  is known, the 
smart meter follows the hash collision procedure to generate the 
two commitments so that MDMS can verify all chameleon hash 
values issued between & and & + 1 intervals later. Using 
polynomial-based approach, updating of trapdoor keys require 
no further encryption/decryption by the smart meters and the 
MDMS. 
Algorithm 2: Generate Hash Collision (smart meter efg , W ≤ g ≤ ) 
Inputs:  
Chameleon trapdoor key: ,  
Smart meter [ encryption key: 
'@ , 
Polynomial: C(), 
Chameleon hash public key: Χ = xG, Υ = yG, 
Chameleon hash value, hash of aggregated readings: ()*(D) , ℎ-FHII(D) ||ΧG, 
Random value: +(D), 
 
Output: +B every period & s.t. ()*(B, +B) = ()*(D)FHII(D) , +(D)G where B ≠
HII(D)   
 
C@ () = ( − 
'-)( − 
') … ( − 
'@ )( − 
'9) + +BB 
 
(1) Substitute 
'@  of smart meter [ in C() to recover secret +BB  
(2) For [ to & do 
(2.1) Sum up readings of smart meter [  
B ← J @(h)
i
hK-
 
End For 
 
+B = ( + )Uℎ(ℎ- (HII(D) || Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ- (B), Υ)V + +(D) ( ) 
 
(3) Split +B into two components, +-B and +B where 
(3.1) +-B ← Uℎ(ℎ-(HII(D) || Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V + +(D) 
(3.2) +B ← +BBUℎ(ℎ-(HII(D) || Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V 
(4) Encrypt (+-B , +B) using 
'@ and send it to MDMS 
 
Algorithm 3: Verification (MDMS) 
Inputs:  
Components of +B: +-B and +B 
Aggregated readings of smart meter [ over a time period &: B 
Random value to blind MDMS’s trapdoor key : +BB ∈ [1,  − 1] 
 
Output: Check ()*(B, +B) ≟ ()*(D) FHII(D) , +(D)G 
 
(1) Divide +B by +BB 
 +B bbb ← Uℎ(ℎ- (HII(D) || Χ), Υ) − ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)V 
(2) Derive +B bbb ← +-B + +B bbb 
(3) For [ to & do 
(3.1) Sum up readings of smart meter [  
B ← J @(h)
i
hK-
 
End For 
(4) Compute ()*(B, +B bbb) = ℎ(ℎ-(B), Υ)(Χ + Υ) + +B bbb ( ) 
(5) If ()*(D) (B, +B bbb) = ()*(D) FHII(D) , +(D)G Then 
Concentrator not compromised 
Else 
Concentrator is compromised 
 
IV. SECURITY DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol. 
A. Key Exposure Freeness 
We assume the concentrator is malicious and attempts to 
intercept the two commitments sent out by the smart meters i.e. 
+-B and +B. Key exposure freeness requires that on seeing the 
commitments, the concentrator is not able to extract the trapdoor 
keys  and  that belongs to the smart meter and MDMS, 
respectively. If the two trapdoor keys are exposed, the 
concentrator is able to impersonate as the smart meter to use any 
false aggregated readings to prove hash collisions. To 
demonstrate our protocol is safe from key exposure, we analyze 
our protocol under two cases: 
• Case 1: (Smart meter is not compromised). The 
commitment values +-B and +B are encrypted using the pre-
shared key 
'@ shared between the smart meter and the 
MDMS. To crack the trapdoor keys of the chameleon hash 
function, the concentrator needs to solve the ECDLP which 
is computationally infeasible based on the underlying point 
multiplication operation and the structure of elliptic curves. 
Thus, our protocol are protected against key exposure. 
• Case 2: (Smart meter is compromised). If the smart 
meter is compromised by an adversary2, it means that its 
pre-shared key 
'@ and the trapdoor key  are exposed. 
However, the adversary is still unable to extract the actual 
value of MDMS’s trapdoor key  because this value is 
blinded by a secret value +BB selected by the MDMS at 
random. In addition, the trapdoor key  is randomized after 
every & period.  With the knowledge of one trapdoor , 
impersonation attacks are not possible. Thus, we can 
conclude that our protocol satisfies the key exposure 
freeness property. To protect the smart meters against 
physical attacks, they can be equipped with Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) which provides tamper-resistant 
hardware for keeping cryptographic keys safe [16]. 
B. Data Integrity 
End to end data integrity is achieved based on the properties 
of the chameleon hash function, namely, trapdoor collision and 
collision resistant. This guarantee is conditioned upon the 
security of the key exposure freeness property that is, the 
trapdoor keys are not exposed.  
• Trapdoor collision property: There exists an efficient 
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm k that on 
input the smart meter’s trapdoor key , the concealed 
trapdoor key + BB of MDMS, a message pair 
Fℎ-(HII(D) ||Χ), +(D)G and an additional self-generated 
message B, the smart meter is able to output a value +B ∈
89 such that hash collision occurs i.e. ()*(B, +B) =
()*(D) (HII(D) , +(D)). This +B value that is sent to the MDMS is 
represented by +-B and +B and serve as a commitment to assist 
                                                          
2 We assume that there is no collusion between the smart meter and the 
concentrator, and that they cannot be compromised at the same time. 
the MDMS in validating the integrity of the aggregated 
readings HII(D)  that was reported by the concentrator at 
time A. If the concentrator modifies the aggregated readings, 
it can be detected without fail based on this property. 
• Collision resistant property: There is no probabilistic 
polynomial time (CC&) algorithm k that on input (' =
(Χ, Υ) and without the knowledge of the trapdoor key 
pair &' = (, ), the concentrator is able to find pairs 
(HII(D) , +(D)) and (B, +B) where HII(D) ≠ B such that 
()*(′, +′) = ()*(D) FHII(D) , +(D)G with a non-negligible 
probability. This is equivalent to solving the ECDLP 
problem which is known to be computationally hard. By this 
property of chameleon hash function, the concentrator is 
always forced to abide by the rules of the protocol because 
such forgery can adversely affect its credibility. 
C. Data Authenticity 
Data authenticity provides assurance that the received 
messages come from the authorized senders. We analyze our 
protocol in two aspects to show that it achieves authentication. 
• Case 1: Concentrator →MDMS: The chameleon hash 
value ()*(D)  sent by the concentrator to the MDMS is signed 
using a digital signature scheme such as the Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [17]. Assuming a 
PKI is available and can verify the concentrator’s public 
key using digital certificates, the authenticity of the origin 
and data can be validated after verifying the ECDSA 
signature. The ECDSA is secure under the assumptions that 
the ECDLP is hard and that the hash function is a random 
function. An unauthenticated concentrator cannot pass off 
as legitimate to perform data aggregation. 
• Case 2: Smart meter → MDMS: Each smart meter [ is 
preloaded with a secret pre-shared key 
'@ that is shared 
between the smart meter and the MDMS. The smart meter 
uses this key to encrypt the commitment (+-B, +B). The use 
of pre-shared key provides guarantee that messages 
originate from authenticated and unique smart meters. 
D. Security of Polynomial Exchange 
Whenever a trapdoor key needs to be randomized, the 
MDMS will broadcast a new polynomial to all the smart meters 
in the group without encryption. We note that sending the 
polynomial in clear will not compromise security because the 
MDMS is sending the expanded form of the polynomial of 
degree  that is, C@ () = 9 − k9m- + ⋯ − o + p − q 
where  denotes the number of smart meters in the group and 
(k, o, p, q) denote the coefficients of the polynomial. If  is 
large, it is proven that finding the roots of the polynomial is NP-
hard [18]. Therefore, it is not easy to recover the concealed 
trapdoor key. Moreover, the trapdoor key is blinded by a 
random + BB. Thus, we conclude that the key blinding phase is 
secure against eavesdropping attacks.  
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate and compare the performance of 
our ECC-based protocol with the DL-based protocol in [11]. 
A. Implementation Details and Results 
Both protocols were implemented in C using OpenSSL 
1.0.2k Crypto library. We are interested in the computational 
time and the CPU cycles with respect to the following: 
• Generating a chameleon hash value by the concentrator 
• Generating a trapdoor collision by the smart meter 
• Verifying the chameleon hash value by the MDMS.  
All tests were executed for 1000 times under Ubuntu 16.04 on 
an i5-3427U CPU@2.3GHz laptop. In our ECC-based 
chameleon implementation, we used a nistp-256 curve that 
provides 128-bits security. In the DL implementation, a 2048-
bit field with 112-bits of security was chosen. Table 1 compares 
the average computing time and CPU cycles for both protocols.  
The simulation results show that ECC-based chameleon 
hashing is significantly more efficient than the DL 
implementation. The time taken to generate a chameleon hash 
on the concentrator based on the ECC construction is 1.096 ms 
while the DL approach requires 5.53 ms. In the case of 
generating a trapdoor hash collision, the ECC version took only 
0.1 ms on the smart meter, while the DL method took nearly 11 
ms.  The DL implementation is more expensive because the 
smart meter needs to perform two modular exponentiations to 
compute the commitments which are computationally costly. In 
terms of performing hash verification by the MDMS, the ECC 
implementation improves the time efficiency by a factor of 1.6 
over the DL approach. These results show that our protocol is 
very efficient and well suited for low-powered devices, 
especially smart meters. A lower computational cost means that 
more resources can be free up on the device to perform other 
tasks. It also indicates higher availability to service more 
requests, thereby improving the scalability. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel end-to-end data 
integrity protocol for AMI to protect data aggregation against 
message tampering. Our protocol is based on an ECC-based 
double trapdoor chameleon hashing. Through informal security 
analysis, we show that our protocol is secure against key 
exposure problem and provides integrity and authenticity 
assurances. We also experimented and demonstrated the high 
efficiency of our ECC-based chameleon hashing by comparing 
it with the DL method. The simulation results show that the 
ECC-based implementation can reduce the computational cost 
of MDMS, concentrator, and smart meters by about 36.8%, 
80%, and 99% respectively. Therefore, our protocol is highly 
suitable for AMI applications. For future work, we plan to 
implement our protocol on a real AMI testbed to validate the 
performance on a larger scale and analyze its security using a 
formal verification tool such as Proverif.  
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Table 1: Timing comparison between ECC and DL implementation 
Chameleon 
Hash Protocol 
Concentrator  Smart Meter MDMS 
Time taken/CPU (ms/megacycles) 
ECC-256 bits 1.096 /2.49 0.1/0.21 1.84/4.21 
DL-2048 bits 5.53/12.92 10.7/25.85 2.91/6.68 
 
